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Elections as Beauty Contests: Do the rules matter? 
 
John Curtice 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Leaders have become the human face of election campaigns. This has lead to the 
suggestion that many voters now vote for the party leader they like best rather than the 
party they prefer. However, people would seem more likely to vote for the leader rather 
than the party in presidential elections rather than parliamentary ones, and amongst 
parliamentary elections themselves when a majoritarian rather than proportional electoral 
system is used. In addition we might expect these propositions to be particularly true if 
few people have a strong party identification and many people watch a lot of television 
news. This paper uses the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems project data to assess 
whether there is any systematic evidence to support these expectations. 
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Introduction 
 
 It has become quite common in discussions of how the electoral process has 
developed over recent decades to suggest that democratic elections have become 
‘presidentialised’. Not only is the outcome of presidential elections increasingly 
influenced by voters’ evaluations of the candidates rather than their parties (Wattenberg, 
1991) but equally the way that people vote in parliamentary elections is also supposedly a 
reflection of what they think of the potential candidates for prime minister rather that the 
respective merits and policy platforms of the political parties (Bean and Mughan, 1989; 
Clarke et al, 1979; Graetz and McAllister, 1987; Stewart and Clarke, 1992; Mughan, 
2000). This change has come about, it is argued, both because of changes in the way that 
elections are fought and in the motivations that voters bring to the ballot box. 
 In making this claim it is also sometimes argued that some forms of parliamentary 
election are more susceptible to this trend than others. Under proportional electoral 
systems in which seats are allocated in at least broad proportion to votes won, who forms 
the next government may well be determined as much by post-electoral coalition 
bargaining as it is by who wins most seats. So if elections held under such systems do not 
determine who forms the government then there would seem less incentive for voters to 
decide for whom to vote on the basis of who might be the best head of government. In 
contrast under majoritarian systems that either formally or in practice tend to ensure that 
bigger parties secure a significantly larger share of the seats than they do of the votes 
such that one party may well win an overall majority (Lijphart, 1999), elections have 
traditionally been regarded as a choice between alternative governments.  Under these 
circumstances the incentive for voters to take into account their evaluations of the party 
leaders in deciding how to vote would seem to be much greater. 
 Although such claims may commonly be made (see also Glaser and Salmon, 
1991; Mughan, 1993; Mughan, 1995; Swanson and Mancini, 1996), the argument that 
evaluations of leaders have come to have a greater influence in presidential elections is 
far from uncontested (Bartels, 2002; Dalton and Wattenberg, 2000; Miller and Shanks, 
1982; Shanks and Miller, 1990; Shanks and Miller, 1991) while there are certainly doubts 
about their importance in parliamentary contests (Bartle and Crewe, 2002; Kaase, 1994; 
King, 2002; Klingemann and Wattenberg, 1992). One of the problems is the relative 
paucity of research on the impact of leader evaluations on voting behaviour in 
parliamentary democracies (MacAllister, 1996). Moreover most of the studies that have 
been conducted to date confine their analysis to one or at best a couple of countries. True, 
one recent important study covered six countries but it consists of six separate studies 
rather than a formal systematic comparison of the countries in question (King, 20002). In 
short, no systematic test across a range of polities has been conducted of the proposition 
that leader evaluations now play as important a role in voters’ choices in parliamentary 
elections as they allegedly do in presidential elections. To our knowledge there is a 
simple reason for this – the necessary data have simply not existed until now. 
 This paper is a first step at filling some of this gap. It uses data on leadership 
evaluations, party evaluations and voting behaviour collected on a systematic basis across 
a range of countries by the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems project 
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(http://www.umich.edu:80/~nes/cses/cses.htm) to provide a direct test of the claim that 
parliamentary elections now resemble presidential contests in the degree to which leader 
evaluations affect the way that people vote and an examination of the argument that this 
is particularly true of parliamentary elections held under majoritarian electoral systems. 
In so doing we also undertake some analysis of the validity of the arguments (outlined in 
the next section) as to why this should be the case. And we find only limited support for 
the claim that parliamentary elections have become beauty contests between party 
leaders. 
 
The Presidentialisation Thesis 
 
 As we have already suggested, there are two strands to the argument that 
parliamentary elections have been turned into presidential contests. One refers to 
developments in the way that elections are fought while the other refers to changes in the 
motivations that voters bring to the ballot box. We will describe each of these briefly in 
turn. 
 The first argument is essentially a claim that parliamentary elections are 
increasingly being fought as if they were presidential contests. The demands and 
opportunities created by television in particular have ensured that the reporting of 
election campaigns has come to be concentrated increasingly on the activities of leaders. 
Television, it is argued, needs relatively accessible visual images to project messages, 
and the personality of a politician provides an image that no party manifesto can ever 
hope to match. At the same time, television cannot necessarily afford to have camera 
crews following a wide range of leading party politicians on the campaign trail and thus it 
tends to focus on the activities of the leader. The parties themselves respond to these 
pressures by focusing their campaigns on their leader, whose image and personality can 
after all be conveyed across the nation by television in a manner that cannot be achieved 
by any other means of communication. The parties may even agree to their leader 
participating in a televised debate with all the other party leaders, debates that are similar 
in style to those which have now become a fixture of US presidential elections, while the 
print media are not immune to the increased focus of election campaigns on leaders 
(Dalton, McAllister and Wattenberg, 2000: 51). In short, election campaigns have in 
effect become gladiatorial contests between the party leaders fought out on the small 
screen. 
 The second argument in contrast refers to relatively well worn themes about how 
voters’ motivations and behaviour have changed. At its heart is the claim that modern 
electorates have experienced a process of partisan dealignment. According to this thesis, 
voters now largely lack the strong emotional attachment to a political party that many of 
them once enjoyed, an attachment that helped bring about the development of party 
identification theory (Campbell et al, 1960). For voters with a strong party attachment or 
identity, political parties were a vital cue, shaping their views about both policies and 
leaders. Thus, for example, they would be inclined to favour a particular policy position 
if it were adopted by the political party with which they identified, while they would be 
likely to oppose it if it were proposed by some other party. And equally, they would tend 
to like a party leader, irrespective of their personal qualities, if that leader were the leader 
of their own party, and to dislike them if they were leading a different party. 
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 For so long as voters had motivations like these, leadership evaluations could 
have little or no independent impact on voting behaviour. They were after all simply 
derivative of party identification. But if, as has been widely argued has happened (Dalton, 
2000; Franklin, Mackie and Valen, 1992; Schmitt and Holmberg, 1995), fewer voters 
now have a strong party identification, not least perhaps because in the television age 
voters are exposed to a wider range of messages than was previously the case, then other 
possible influences can be expected to play a role in their decision about how to vote. 
Amongst those other influences might be what they think about the issues at stake or of 
the merits of the alternative leaders with whom they have been presented. And of course 
they have every incentive to focus on the latter if indeed the first argument that leaders 
themselves have become more prominent in election campaigns is correct. 
 These arguments suggest that our analysis should take into account two features 
of a country’s electorate in our analysis as well as the institutional rules. The first is how 
pervasive television is as means of political communication. The second is the incidence 
of strong party identification. The more that people watch television and the less that they 
identify strongly with a party the more that they can be expected to take leadership 
evaluations into account.  
 
Data and Method 
 
 To test these propositions we use data from the Comparative Study of Electoral 
Systems (CSES) project (http://www.umich.edu:80/~nes/cses/cses.htm). This project is a 
voluntary collaboration between national election studies across the world. Each country 
devotes about ten minutes of questionnaire time to asking a module of questions in a 
common format while at the same time also collecting a range of commonly coded socio -
economic background information. In each case the data are collected as soon as possible 
immediately after an election has been held. This means of course that rather than being 
undertaken at one point in time the data collection is spread across a number of years. In 
our case we are analysing data collected by the first CSES collaboration between 1996 
and 2002.  
 This first wave of collaboration provides us with relevant data for no less than 40 
elections in 29 countries.1 Some of these elections are presidential, some parliamentary. 
Some of the latter are held using a majoritarian electoral system, others a more 
proportional one. This means we can examine systematically how far the relationship 
between leader evaluations and vote choice varies according to the electoral rules in force 
at an election. No longer are we forced to rely on just one or two examples of the use a 
particular electoral rule. In each case we have the luxury of a number of examples, giving 
us a much better chance of assessing just how generalisable are the propositions that we 
are assessing.  
 The CSES project collected three simple but crucial pieces of information of 
relevance to our purposes here. First, respondents were asked to state on a scale ranging 
from 0 to 10 how much they liked or disliked each of the main party leaders. Normally, 
                                                
1 This tally of 40 elections includes six instances where both a parliamentary and a 
presidential election was held on the same date and details of how respondents voted are 
available for both. 
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evaluations of up to six party leaders were collected in each country, these being the  
leaders whose party enjoyed significant representation in that country’s legislature or the 
presidential candidates who were expected to win more than a small share of the vote. 
The relationship between these evaluations and vote then provides us with our  crucial 
indicator of the impact of leadership evaluations on vote. 
 Second, using exactly the same scale the CSES project also asked respondents 
how much they liked or disliked each of the main political parties. We have seen that the 
presidentialisation thesis argues that evaluations of leaders comprise one of the factors 
that have come to replace evaluations of parties in determining how people vote. This 
implies that rather than just looking at the variation between countries in the relationship 
between leadership evaluations and vote, we should be examining the variation in the 
relative importance of leadership and party evaluations. By deploying the party like and 
dislike data in addition to the leader like and dislike data, we can adopt this approach. 
 Finally, the CSES project also collected data on both the direction and strength of 
party identification in a systematically comparable manner across countries. These data 
enable us to assess one of the claims of the presidentialisation thesis about why 
leadership evaluations may have come to matter in parliamentary elections. We use here 
a measure of strength of partisanship. Those respondents who said that they felt close to a 
particular party were asked, ‘Do you feel very close to this party, somewhat close, or not 
very close?’. This provides us with an indicator of incidence of strong partisanship, that is 
the proportion who said they were either ‘very’ or ‘somewhat’ close. 
 The CSES project did not however collect one of the pieces of information that 
we need, that is the degree to which voters are exposed to television coverage of political 
affairs. For this we rely on information collected by the third wave of the World Values 
Study, which asked its respondents how many hours a week they watched television. Our 
indicator of the degree to which a country’s electorate is exposed to television is the 
proportion who say that they watch television for three hours or more a day. Note that as 
the question asked by the World Values Study refers to television watching in general 
rather than watching television news in particular, we have to assume that where the 
incidence of watching television in general is relatively high so also in the propensity to 
watch the news on television. We should also note that these data are unavailable for 12 
of our 29 countries. 
 How then do we deploy these data? It should by now be apparent that we have 
information on leader and party evaluations for each of the main parties at each of 32 
elections in 29 countries. But not all of these party leaders have an equally realistic 
chance of becoming Prime Minister (or indeed President). Those who lead big parties, 
and perhaps particularly those who lead one of the two largest parties in a country, are far 
more likely to become the head of government than are those who lead a small party.  So 
it would not be surprising if voters were more likely to take more notice of their 
evaluations of the leaders of big parties in deciding how to vote than they do their 
evaluations of leaders of smaller parties. And of course, it might be the case too that a 
leader of a small party finds it more difficult to convert personal popularity into votes 
because of strategic disincentives to voting for a small party. So we have to allow for the 
possibility not  that all leader evaluations matter as much in parliamentary elections as 
they do in presidential ones (or in parliamentary elections using a majoritarian electoral 
system as in presidential ones) but rather that evaluations of those party leaders with a 
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chance of becoming Prime Minister matter as much as do evaluations of presidential 
candidates. 
 This suggests then that we require a data structure that allows us to examine how 
the role of leadership evaluations in the voting decision varies according to the 
characteristics of both countries and parties. To exploit this opportunity we adopt a very 
simple two stage approach. In the first stage we acquire an estimate of the impact of 
leadership evaluations and party evaluations on vote for each party in each country. This 
is done by undertaking a multiple linear regression of vote, dichotomised as 1 if the 
respondent voted for the party in question and 0 otherwise, against leader and party 
evaluations using the individual level data for the relevant country. 2 
 It is these coefficients that then become the focus of our analysis in the second 
stage.3 We analyse how the coefficients vary according to the characteristics of the party, 
election, and country in question. For each country we have the level of strong party 
identification (derived from the relevant CSES data set) and level of television viewing 
(derived from the World Values Study). We have divided our 38 elections into 
presidential and parliamentary contests and then coded the electoral system used in the 
latter according to whether it is primarily majoritarian, proportional or mixed. The last of 
these categories typically refers to those countries in which some seats are allocated 
according to a majoritarian principle, some by a proportional method and where the latter 
are not allocated such as to overcome the disproportionality generated by the outcome in 
the former.4 Details of how we have classified each country’s electoral system can be 
found in Table 1 below. Meanwhile we also have available to us the share of the vote 
                                                
2 We are course aware that normally a logit or probit procedure would be preferable in 
the analysis of a dichotomous dependent variable. Linear regression gives us however a 
more easily interpreted metric for the second stage of our analysis described in the next 
paragraph. 
3 An alternative procedure would have been to have been to ‘stack’ the CSES data set so 
that each combination of party and respondent was represented as a case (see van der Eijk 
and Franklin, 1996), and then to ascertain the impact of electoral system and party size on 
the relationship between vote and leader evaluations by fitting relevant interaction terms 
such as leader evaluation * toptwo party * majoritarian electoral system. This procedure 
could not however be applied to our examination of the impact of exposure to television 
(because our data on television watching come from a different source) while the range 
and complexity of the interaction terms that would have had to be fitted would have made 
our data analysis far more complex. 
4 Our principle sources of information on the characteristics of each country’s electoral; 
system were Reynolds and Reilly (1997) and Blais and Massicote (2002), supplemented 
where necessary by consultation with a range of appropriate Internet sites. Note that the 
mixed ca tegory does not include those two-tier electoral systems, such as that used in 
Germany, in which the disproportionalities created by one tier are wholly are largely 
corrected by the allocation of seats in the other tier. Although such systems may mix 
different principles for allocating seats in the two tiers, the final allocation of seats 
reflects the proportionate principle as much as it does in any other proportional system. 
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won by each party in our 40 elections, thereby enabling us to distinguish between the two 
largest parties in each country from the remainder.5 
 In the event we were able to implement this procedure successfully for 27 parties 
contesting nine presidential elections and 133 parties contesting 31 parliamentary ones.6 
Details of the countries that are included and how their elections have been classified are 
given in table 1. 
                                                
5 Regional parties that fought in seats in only part of a country (such as the Canadian 
Bloc Quebecois) are excluded from the analysis as the relationship between both vote and 
both leader and party evaluations could be affected by the inability of some voters to vote 
for that party. Parties that fought in an electoral alliance (such as the Christian Democrats 
(CDU) and the Christian Socialist Union (CSU) in Germany) are analysed as one party, 
using the party and leader evaluations for the largest partner (or in the case of the German 
CSU/CDU where there is a clear territorial demarcation between the areas that they 
contest, the CSU party evaluations for voters in Bavaria and the CDU party evaluations 
elsewhere). 
6 Note that apart from the six instances where both a parliamentary and presidential 
elections was held on the same day, there are three countries where data for more than 
one election held on different days is available. Some parties are thus represented more 
than once in our data set and contribute more than one to the tally of parties reported 
here. 
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Table 1. Countries and Type of Election 
 
 Presidential Elections 
 
 Belarus    Peru 
 Israel*     Romania 
 Lithuania    Taiwan 
 Mexico    USA 
 
 
 Parliamentary Elections 
 
     Electoral System 
 
 Proportional   Mixed   Majoritarian  
 
 Czech Republic  Japan   Australia 
Denmark   Russia    Canada 
 Germany   South Korea  Great Britain   
 Hungary   Taiwan  USA 
Iceland   Ukraine 
Israel 
Mexico    
 New Zealand   
 Netherlands  
Norway 
Peru 
 Poland 
 Portugal 
 Romania 
 Slovenia 
 Spain 
 Sweden 
 Switzerland 
  
 
* Direct election of Prime Minister 
  
 
 
Results 
 
 The first proposition that we have to test is that leadership evaluations now have 
just as much influence on the way that people vote in parliamentary elections as they do 
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in presidential ones. Equally we also have a more refined claim that leadership 
evaluations have as much influence on voting behaviour in those parliamentary elections 
held under a majoritarian electoral system as they do in a presidential election. 
 Table 2 provides a simple test of these two propositions. In the first column it 
shows the mean partial regression coefficient we obtained across all parties for the impact 
of party evaluations on vote choice in presidential elections and in parliamentary ones, 
the latter broken down by the type of electoral system used.  In the second column we 
show the equivalent statistic for leader evaluations 
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Table 2. Impact of Leader and Party Evaluations by Type of Election 
 
   Mean Partial Regression Coefficient (x102) for 
 
   Party Evaluations   Leader Evaluations 
 
Presidential Elections  .33    .36  (27) 
 
Parliamentary Elections .51    .15  (133) 
 
  Electoral System 
 Proportional  .51    .15  (97) 
 Mixed   .49    .13  (23) 
 Majoritarian  .59    .24  (13) 
 
 However we look at the table, there is clearly no support for either of our two 
propositions. On average leader evaluations appear to be as important as party 
evaluations in presidential elections. In parliamentary elections they do not have even one 
third of the influence of party evaluations. And even where a majoritarian electoral 
system is in place, leader evaluations are not even as half as important as party 
evaluations. Meanwhile, we have almost exactly the same figures for mixed systems as 
we do for proportional ones. Parliamentary elections remain very different in character 
from their presidential counterparts. 
 Mind you we should not run away with the idea that leadership are always 
relatively important even in presidential elections. There is considerable variation 
amongst our examples. Leadership evaluations are clearly relatively important in the US 
where the coefficient for leadership evaluations is, at .93, more than twice as large as the 
coefficient for party evaluations (.39). At the other end of the spectrum is Mexico where 
leadership evaluations apparently have no discernible impact on vote choice at all. So 
even presidential elections are not always personal. The tendency of such elections to 
focus voters’ attentions on the attributes of candidates rather than their parties is a 
tendency rather than an invariant rule.  
 One result does though fit what we might have expected. This is that leader 
evaluations seem to matter more in majoritarian systems than in proportional ones. 
However we should note that so also do party evaluations. Indeed the difference between 
the impact of leader and party evaluations is almost the same in majoritarian electoral 
systems as it is under proportional ones. So the relative impact of leader evaluations 
appears to be no greater in majoritarian systems than in proportional ones. 
 Still, perhaps we should bear in mind that we suggested that leader evaluations 
would matter more for those parties whose leader was a likely contender for the post of 
Prime Minister, and that the presidentialisation of parliamentary elections might only be 
in the impact that leader evaluations have on support for larger parties. So in Table 3 we 
repeat our analysis of parliamentary elections but this time looking only at those two 
parties occupying first and second place at each election. 
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Table 3 Impact of Leader and Party Evaluations for Top Two Parties in 
Parliamentary Elections by Type of Electoral System 
 
 
   Mean Partial Regression Coefficient (x102) for 
 
   Party Evaluations   Leader Evaluations 
  
Type of Electoral System 
 
Proportional   .68    .26  (34) 
Mixed    .69    ,24  (10) 
Majoritarian   .62    .28   (8) 
 
 All   .67    .26  (54) 
 
 Leader evaluations do indeed seem to be rather more important here than they did 
in Table 2. But they still nothing like approach the relative impact that that table indicated 
they have in presidential elections – not least because party evaluations also matter more 
in this table than they did in the lower half of Table 2. At most what we can argue from 
Table 3 is that party evaluations are somewhat relatively more important where a 
majoritarian electoral system is in place than where a proportional one is used. The 
difference between the regression coefficient for party and leader evaluations is, at .34, 
somewhat smaller for majoritarian systems than the equivalent figure for proportional 
ones (.42).  
 So we have at most found but limited evidence that the role of leader evaluations 
in vote choice may be somewhat more important in parliamentary elections where a 
majoritarian electoral system is in place than where a proportional one is used, even if 
their relative impact does not approach that found on average in presidential systems. But 
the fact that even this only becomes apparent when we confine our attention to the two 
largest parties in a country suggests that perhaps what matters is not the electoral system 
that is being used but the character of the competition between the parties. If two parties 
clearly dominate the electoral map such that elections are clearly primarily a choice 
between two major parties then perhaps leader evaluations will matter more irrespective 
of the kind of electoral system that is being used.  
We might define as a two-party system any polity where the two largest parties 
each secure at least 30% of the vote while no other party manages to win as much as 
20%, a condition that is not only satisfied in all our majoritarian countries apart from 
Canada but also in four countries with proportional systems (Germany, Hungary, Spain 
and Portugal) together with one with a mixed system (South Korea).  However there is no 
evidence that leader evaluations matter more in the five non-majoritarian countries with 
two-party systems. At .76 the mean coefficient for leader evaluations is actually both 
higher than it is in other non-majoritarian countries (.65) while that for leader evaluations 
is rather lower (.22 v .27). 
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 We have then cast considerable doubt on the validity of the presidentialisation 
thesis. But this does not necessarily mean that all of the underlying premises of that thesis 
are incorrect. It might still be true that leader evaluations matter more in those countries 
where fewer voters have a strong party identification. And equally it may also be true that 
leader evaluations matter more of voters see a lot of their leaders on television. It is to 
these two questions that we now turn. 
 
Table 4 Correlation between impact of Leader and Party Evaluations and incidence 
of strong partisanship 
 
 
     Correlation between partial regression coefficient 
     And % with strong party identification 
     Party  Leader  Party-Leader 
Evaluations   Evaluations  Evaluations 
 
Presidential Elections   .40  .52  -.10  (27) 
 
Parliamentary Elections   .25  -.07  .28  (122) 
 
 Kind of Party 
  Toptwo  .07  -.05  .08  (50) 
  Other   .44  -.10  .49  (72) 
  
 
 First of all we look at how far the impact of leader evaluations on vote varies 
according to the proportion of people in a country with a strong party identification. 
Table 4 shows the correlation between the % of people in a country who say they are 
very or somewhat close to a party and (a) the partial regression coefficient for party 
evaluations, (b) the partial regression coefficient for leader evaluations, and (c) the 
difference between (a) and (b). In the case of (a) and (b) a positive coefficient indicates 
that the evaluation in question has a stronger impact on vote choice the more strong party 
identifiers there are, while in the case of (c) a positive coefficient indicates that party 
evaluations are relatively more important than leader evaluations the more party 
identifiers there are. These coefficients are shown separately for presidential and 
parliamentary elections and amongst the latter separately for those parties that comprise 
the top two parties in their country, and the remainder. 
As we would expect, party evaluations are indeed more strongly related to vote 
choice where there is a large proportion of strong party identifiers, although in 
parliamentary democracies this effects appears confined to smaller parties. But contrary 
to what we would expect given the arguments of the presidentialisation thesis, leade r 
evaluations are also more strongly related to the vote where there are more strong party 
identifiers. However, this latter point is not true in parliamentary elections and so here at 
least there is some suggestion that for smaller parties at least the relative impact of leader 
evaluations is greater where there are fewer party identifiers, as confirmed by the positive 
correlations in the third column of Table 4. 
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So once again we can at best find limited evidence to support the claims of the 
presidentialisation thesis. Nowhere have we uncovered a strong negative relationship 
between the incidence of strong party identification and the impact of leadership 
evaluations on vote choice. We have best some limited evidence that leadership 
evaluations may be relatively more important in parliamentary elections where there are 
fewer partisans, but even so this effect seems largely confined to those party leaders who 
have little prospect of actually becoming prime minister.  
 
 
Table 5 Correlation between impact of Leader and Party Evaluations and incidence 
of heavy television watching  
 
     Correlation between partial regression coefficient 
     And % heavy TV watching 
     Party  Leader  Party-Leader 
Evaluations   Evaluations  Evaluations 
 
Presidential Elections   -.58  .47  -.77  (23) 
 
Parliamentary Elections   -.17  .26  -.28  (74) 
 
 Kind of Party 
  Toptwo  -.20  .36  -.33  (34) 
  Other   -.18  .20  -.24  (40) 
 
 
 What of the second causal process put forward by the presidentialisation thesis? 
In Table 5 we show the equivalent analysis to that in Table 4 but looking instead at the 
relationship between our partial regression coefficients and vote in that subset of our 
countries for which we have information from the World Values Study on the proportion 
of people who watch television for three or more hours a day. If the presidentialisation 
thesis is correct we would expect to find a negative correlation between the incidence of 
heavy television watching and the impact of party evaluations, but a positive one between 
television watching and leader evaluations. And, as Table 6 shows, this indeed is 
precisely what we find, both for presidential and parliamentary elections and also for both 
bigger and smaller parties. It appears that heavy exposure to television is indeed 
assoc iated with a greater personalisation of the political process. 
 
 
Table 6 Regression Analysis of Difference between impact of Leader and Party 
Evaluations in Parliamentary Elections  
 
 
       Beta Coefficients 
      Model 1  Model 2 
Toptwo Party     .713 *   .339 * 
 15 
% strong party id     .410 *   - 
% heavy TV watchers     -   -.193  
Interaction between 
 Toptwo Party and % strong party id -.422   - 
 Toptwo Party and Majoritarian 
   System  -.187 *   -.281 * 
 
R2        20%   22% 
 
* significant at the 5% level 
 
 
 However even this apparent evidence in support of the presidentialisation thesis 
needs to be treated with caution. For further analysis reveals that high levels of television 
watching are more common in those countries with majoritarian electoral systems, where 
as saw earlier the relative impact of leader evaluations is rather stronger so far as the 
principal competitors for power are concerned at least. And indeed if we construct a 
formal model of the relationship between the incidence of heavy TV watching and the 
difference between our party and leader coefficients while controlling for the other 
apparent patterns we have found amongst our parliamentary elections, then we find that 
the relationship is no longer significant. This can be seen in the second model shown in 
Table 6, which also includes whether a coefficient is for one of the top two parties in a 
country and whether it is for one of the top two parties in a majoritarian system. Both of 
our controls are significant – party evaluations are relatively more important for top two 
parties in general but less important where a majoritarian system is used thereby 
affirming our earlier conclusions. But the level of heavy television watching is not. This 
of course does not disconfirm our finding in respect of presidential elections but it 
suggests that there are clear limits to the personalisation of politics that may be induced 
by heavy television exposure. 
 The first model in table 6 provides a more formal confirmation of our findings in 
respect of the impact of high levels of strong party identification amongst our full set of 
parliamentary elections. Again we see that the relative impact of party evaluations is 
higher in respect of the top two parties in a country while leader evaluations are relatively 
more important where such a party is competing under a majoritarian electoral system.  
Meanwhile we find that leader evaluations are relatively less important is there is a low 
incidence of strong party identification but that this is attenuated (if not significantly so) 
in the case of top two parties. 
 
Discussion 
 
 We have found very little evidence to support the claim that parliamentary 
elections have become presidential contests. Leader evaluations clearly have far less 
influence on the way that people vote in parliamentary elections than they do in 
presidential contests. True there is some evidence that leader evaluations may be a little 
more important when voters are deciding whether to vote for one of the two big parties in 
a majoritarian electoral system than is the case under more proportional systems, but they 
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still do not approach the level of importance often found in presidential elections. 
Meanwhile we have found only limited support for two of the causal processes that are 
thought to be respons ible for the presidentialisation of parliamentary elections, viz. that 
leader evaluations are relatively more important when party identification is low and 
attention to television is high. It appears that we should concur with Dalton and 
Wattenburg (2000)  that the institutional form of parliamentary elections severely inhibits 
the degree to which voters are ever likely to use leader evaluations as a basis on which to 
decide how to vote. 
 However, we do not want readers simply to come away with the impression that 
our research shows that leaders have little electoral relevance in countries that hold 
parliamentary elections. We have in effect been examining claims that voters’ evaluations 
of leaders’ personalities have become more important than their impress ions of political 
parties as a cue in the voting decision. But arguably such an expectation is always likely 
to be a misguided one in a parliamentary democracy. It might make sense in a country 
like the United States with a weak party system as well as a presidential system to 
conceive of leaders demonstrating their importance by campaigning separately from their 
parties. But in a parliamentary democracy a powerful leader can be expected to 
demonstrate their influence by being able to shape the image of the party that they lead. If 
this is the case then leaders matter not because of their ability to win votes independently 
of their party on the basis of their personal appeal but rather because they can have a 
decisive impact on voters’ evaluations of the parties that they lead. 
 Such a perspective does not deny the possibility of a presidentialisation thesis. 
But it is one of a rather different kind to that analysed here. If parties’ sources of electoral 
support are determined less strongly now by traditional sociological and ideological 
cleavages, they may well have more incentive and indeed opportunity to change the 
image that they portray in the hope of increasing their support (Kircheimer, 1966: 
Epstein, 1967). Meanwhile as the decline of traditional social ties brings about a decline 
in the role of the mass party and the dominance of television in election campaigns makes 
national election campaigns centred around leaders the most important part of any party’s 
campaign, so leaders may well find themselves better able to influence what the electoral 
strategy and appeal of their party should be (Farrell and Webb, 2000; Scarrow, Webb and 
Farrell, 2000). If these suppositions are correct, then amongst parliamentary democracies 
at least presidentialisation may take the form of more powerful leaders better able to 
shape and reshape the images of their parties in their own likeness rather than the advent 
of leaders whose appeal is different and distinct from that of their parties. 
 But testing such a thesis would require a very different approach to that adopted 
here. First we would need to examine whether party leaders have become more powerful 
in shaping the electoral strategy of their parties. For that there does indeed appear to be 
some evidence (Katz and Mair, 1995; Farrell and Webb, 2000; Scarrow, Webb and 
Farrell, 2000). And second we would need to examine whether the images that voters 
have of leaders have in fact become more similar to those that they have of parties.  So 
far as we are aware this second step has not been taken, and indeed we suspect that in 
most if not all countries it is unlikely that the necessary data exist to do so.  
 
Conclusion 
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 This paper casts severe doubt on claims that evaluations of leaders are now as 
important as evaluations of parties in voters’ electoral calculus in parliamentary 
democracies. It even finds that there is only limited evidence that this is true of those 
parliamentary democracies that have a majoritarian electoral system. In parliamentary 
democracies at least, voters’ evaluations of leaders have not as yet at least become a 
substitute for their evaluations of parties in deciding how to vote. It may be possible to 
become president simply by persuading voters to like yourself and ignore your party, but 
becoming prime minister still primarily involves persuading voters to like your political 
allies rather than just yourself 
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